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Abstract
The application of the separate interests test has thus far been attempted only with foreign
entities; its acceptance in light of the recent Ninth Circuit decision in the MCA case remains un-
certain. In domestic entity classifications, a mechanical analysis continues to be utilized. This
Note will introduce the separate interests test, discuss its inconsistencies, and demonstrate how
its application may lead to a different result. It will then explore the implications of applying
the test retroactively and exclusively to foreign entities. Because the problem addressed by the
application of the separate interests test could be more effectively resolved by legislative action,
recommendations will be made for possible legislative changes. These changes would prevent
United States controlled foreign entities from avoiding United States taxes by adhering to the me-
chanical approach of I.R.C. 7701. After reviewing the history of I.R.C. 7701 and its regulations,
which apply to both foreign and domestic entities, Part I discusses the separate interests test intro-
duced in Revenue Ruling 77-214 and adopted by the district court in MCA v. United States. The
Ninth Circuit court, in overruling the district court, leaves the separate interest test as viable law
since it distinguishes the MCA facts from those of Revenue Ruling 77-214. Part II criticizes the
test and concludes that legislative change will achieve a more effective and just solution to United
States tax avoidance by US controlled foreign entities.
THE SEPARATE INTERESTS TEST: A NEW HURDLE IN
FOREIGN ENTITY CLASSIFICATION
INTRODUCTION
United States taxpayers transacting business abroad fre-
quently' need to ascertain whether their foreign entities will be
classified as corporations or as partnerships under Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C. or Code) Section 7701.2 Particularly, when a foreign
entity controlled by a United States controlled foreign corporation
(CFC) 3 is found to be a corporation under this section, it is gov-
1. Foreign entity classification is important to determine whether the entity is governed
by Subpart F and thus whether foreign earnings are subject to tax when remitted as dividends
or when earned by the entity. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982). See also Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 21 n.23, MCA Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as MCA Appellant Brief]. Entity classification is also relevant when deciding whether
transfers of property to foreign entities are taxable, and if so, at what time and to what
extent; whether loss or income is recognized currently or deferred until distributed to the
United States' taxpayers other than pursuant to Subpart F; whether gain or loss on a sale is to
be taxed as a capital or as an ordinary item; whether liquidation is a taxable event; and
whether foreign entities are engaged in business and subject to tax in the United States.
I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982). Entity classification is also determinative in ascertaining the source
and taxability of income derived through a foreign entity; the allocation of income and
deductions for purposes of computing the taxable income of foreign entities; the treatment of
foreign exchange items in determining current income and earnings and profits of foreign
operations; and the treatment of foreign entities under tax treaties between the United States
and foreign countries. Id. See New York State Bar Association Committee on Foreign
Activities of United States Taxpayers, Report on Foreign Entity Characterization for Federal
Income Tax Purposes, 35 TAx L. REV. 169 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as Tax Section
Report].
2. I.R.C. § 7701 (1982). The Internal Revenue Code defines partnership and corpora-
tions as follows:
(a) When used in this title [Internal Revenue Code], where not otherwise distinctly
expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof
(2) Partnership and Partner.-The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not,
within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term
"partner" includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
organization.
(3) Corporation.-The term "corporation" includes associations, joint-stock com-
panies, and insurance companies.
Id. See also infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
3. I.R.C. § 957 (1982). A controlled foreign corporation is defined in pertinent part in
the I.R.C. as follows:
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of this subpart, the term "controlled foreign
corporation" means any foreign corporation of which more than 50 percent of the
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erned by Subpart F 4 of the Code and its income is taxable when
earned.5 Conversely, when an entity controlled by a CFC is found
to be a partnership, its income is exempt from the Subpart F
provisions and is taxable when repatriated. 6 International tax coun-
sel, therefore, must consider not only the particular laws and busi-
ness climate of the foreign state in which a client wishes to establish
a corporation or a partnership, but also the United States tax impli-
cations of the type of foreign entity recommended. 7 The incongrui-
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned ...by
United States shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign
corporation.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of controlled foreign corporations and the separate
interests test, see infra notes 68-147 and accompanying text.
4. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982). See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
5. Subpart F income is defined in I.R.C. § 952 (1982). Income of a foreign corporation
controlled by a CFC, see supra note 3, is taxable when earned as a result of the interconnec-
tion of a number of Subpart F sections. I.R.C. § 952 includes as Subpart F income "the
foreign base company income (as determined under section 954)." I.R.C. § 952(a)(2) (1982).
Foreign base company income (FBCI) is defined in § 954 and includes "the foreign personal
holding company income for the taxable year (determined under subsection (c) and reduced
as provided in subsection (b)(5))." I.R.C. § 954(a)(1) (1982). Foreign Personal Holding
Company Income (FPHCI) is defined in § 954(c) and includes
(3) Certain income derived in active conduct of trade or business. -For
purposes of paragraph (1), foreign personal holding company income does not
include-
(A) rents and royalties which are derived in the active conduct of a trade or
business and which are received from a person other than a related person (within
the meaning of subsection (d)(3)) ....
I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A) (1982). A related person is defined in § 954(d)(3) as follows: "(3)
Related person defined.-For purposes of this section, a person with respect to a controlled
foreign corporation, if- . . . (B) such person is a corporation which controls, or is con-
trolled by, the controlled foreign corporation ...." I.R.C. § 954(d)(3)(B) (1982).
Therefore, if a foreign entity is a corporation, the income received by the CFC from that
foreign entity is Subpart F income, taxable to the United States domestic parent in the year
earned. Only if the related person's income exceeds 70% of the CFC's entire income does it
trigger the operation of Subpart F. The Code would then require taxation of the income of
the related person, as well as the entire income of the CFC. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(B) (1982). A
de minimus rule is put forth in I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) which provides that if the FBCI is less
than 10% of the CFC's gross income, no part of the gross income shall be treated as FBCI
includable in Subpart F income.
6. Partnership income does not meet the requirements of a "related person" under
Subpart F. I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (1982). Therefore, the income of the partnership is not taxable
until repatriated to the United States parent corporation in the form of dividends. See I.R.C.
§ 61(7) (1982). See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
7. For general discussions on taxation of United States foreign controlled companies, see
1 R. RHOADES & E. STEINBERG, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 3.01-
.06 (1979); M. MOORE & R. BAGLEY, U.S. TAX ASPECTS OF DOING BusINEss ABROAD 115-46
(1978).
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ties in foreign entity classification motivate taxpayers to seek assur-
ance that prior interpretations of the I.R.C. can be relied upon.
The "separate interests test," introduced by a Revenue Ruling 8 and
recently reviewed by a court,9 has caused taxpayer confusion and
created controversy in the area.
The separate interests test does not follow prior interpretations
of I.R.C. § 770110 and its regulations.'" The Internal Revenue
Service (I.R.S. or Service), in applying the test, looks beyond an
entity's legal structure to its ownership.' 2 The test considers the
relationship among the entity's owners to determine whether their
interests are unified or separate.' 3 A finding of either a unified
interest, or lack of separate interests, among the entity's owners
results in an entity's being classified differently than a taxpayer may
have anticipated.' 4 Through application of this test, certain entities
with related owners which had been organized to be classified as
partnerships under I.R.C. § 7701 have been reclassified as corpora-
tions.' 5 A determination of this type frustrates United States taxpay-
ers' attempts to achieve tax deferral on their foreign source income
through entity classification.16
The application of the test has thus far been attempted only
with foreign entities; 17 its acceptance in light of the recent Ninth
Circuit decision in the MCA case remains uncertain. 8 In domestic
entity classifications, a mechanical analysis continues to be uti-
lized.'" This Note will introduce the separate interests test, discuss
its inconsistencies, and demonstrate how its application may lead to
8. Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B. 408. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
9. MCA Inc. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 685 F.2d 1099
(9th Cir. 1982).
10. See supra note 2.
11. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -2, T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, T.D. 7515, 1977-2
C.B. 482.
12. Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408-09; MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 844-46.
13. Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408-09; MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 844-46.
14. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408-09; MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 838-40.
15. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 409; MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 846.
16. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 409; MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 846.
17. The test has been applied only twice. Both Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, and the
district court in MCA, 502 F. Supp. 838, are concerned with the application of the separate
interests test to a foreign entity. For further discussion see infra notes 98-147 and accompany-
ing text.
18. MCA, 685 F.2d at 1104-05.
19. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 159 (1976). In both cases, the court upheld the literal interpretation of Treas. Reg. §§
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a different result. It will then explore the implications of applying
the test retroactively and exclusively to foreign entities .20 Because
the problem addressed by the application of the separate interests
test could be more effectively resolved by legislative action, recom-
mendations will be made for possible legislative changes. These
changes would prevent United States controlled foreign entities
from avoiding United States taxes by adhering to the mechanical
approach of I.R.C. § 7701. After reviewing the history of I.R.C. §
7701 and its regulations, which apply to both foreign and domestic
entities, Part I discusses the separate interests test introduced in
Revenue Ruling 77-21421 and adopted by the district court in MCA
v. United States.2 2 The Ninth Circuit court, in overruling the dis-
trict court, leaves the separate interests test as viable law since it
distinguishes the MCA facts from those of Revenue Ruling 77-214.23
Part II criticizes the test and concludes that legislative change will
achieve a more effective and just solution to United States tax
avoidance by United States controlled foreign entities.
I. THE SEPARATE INTERESTS TEST
In classifying foreign entities, one must consider I.R.C. § 7701,
its accompanying regulations, and their interaction with United
States tax laws pertaining to foreign source income, particularly
Subpart F.2 4 To better understand the Service's introduction of the
separate interests test, it is necessary first to examine I.R.C. § 7701
and its accompanying regulations.
A. Domestic Entity Classification and I.R.C. § 7701
The historical development of classifying domestic entities for
tax purposes highlights the inconsistencies between I.R.C. § 7701
301.7701-1 to -2. 524 F.2d at 745; 66 T.C. at 185. See also infra notes 52-67 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of Zuckman and Larson.
20. See infra notes 68-147 and accompanying text.
21. Supra note 8, at 408.
22. 502 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal. 1980). The separate interests test is not found in either
the I.R.C. or the Regulations. The MCA case is a "judicial authorization" to use this test
when looking "behind mere formalities to make an independent determination" of entity
classification. Hamilton, MCA -Classification of Foreign Entities as Associations or Partner-
ships, 7 INT'L TAX J. 292, 296 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton]. See also Hamilton,
MCA, Inc. -Classification of Foreign Entities as Associations or Partnerships, 59 TAXES 303
(1981) (for a similar discussion of the case).
23. MCA, 685 F.2d at 1103.
24. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982). See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
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and its regulations and is helpful in understanding the current
confusion in the area. Methods of classifying domestic entities de-
veloped from the interplay of judicial decision and legislative codi-
fication. The seminal Supreme Court case of Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner 25 put forth the six characteristics to be examined in
evaluating whether an entity is to be taxed as a corporation.2 6 The
Morrissey characteristics were first codified in the Internal Revenue
Code of 193927 and later appeared as I.R.C. § 7701 in the reorgan-
ized Internal Revenue Code of 1954.28 Prior to Morrissey, the I.R.S.
had resisted taxpayers' attempts to classify unincorporated entities
as corporations, especially when the entity sought pension advan-
tages comparable to those of corporations. 29 The 1960 amendments
to the regulations under I.R.C. § 7701 were drafted with the intent
to make it difficult for an entity to qualify as a corporation. 30 The
I.R.S. was concerned with limiting the availability of pension ad-
vantages and other fringe benefits. 31
The Service promulgated the 1960 amendments in reaction toits inability to convince the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Kintner 32 to adopt a bias against finding an unincorporated entity
25. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that a trust was taxable as
a corporation. The Court found the beneficiaries' extent of control over the trust was
substantial enough to make corporate tax treatment appropriate. Id. at 359-60.
26. Id. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, supra note 11, defines the six characteristics as follows:
There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation
which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i) Associ-
ates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii)
continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests.
Id. § 3 0 1.7701-2(a)(1).
27. I.R.C. § 3797(a)(1)-(3) (1939). It took the Internal Revenue Service almost 25 years toincorporate the characteristics of limited liability and free transferability of interests into its
regulations. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126.
28. Fisher, Classification Under Section 7701-The Past, Present, and Prospects for the
Future, 30 TAx LAW. 627, 629 (1977).
29. Id. Fisher has summarized the IRS's position as follows:
As is generally known, the Service was greatly concerned in the years before and
after the enactment of the Code of 1954 that unincorporated entities, mostly in theform of professional partnerships, were qualifying as corporations, thereby taking
advantage of the benefits of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans. Repeatedly,
and with equal lack of success, the government attacked professional organizations
that sought corporate benefits.
Id.
30. See id. at 630.
31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
32. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). In Kintner, the Articles of Association of an organiza-
tion of medical doctors provided that the entity would terminate upon the death of the last
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a corporation. In Kintner, the court held that an association of
medical doctors was a corporation for federal tax purposes. 33 The
Kintner regulations were drafted to ensure that these entities would
not be classified as corporations in the future. 34 The regulations
were thus slanted toward the finding of a partnership to prevent
entities from obtaining corporate advantages.3 5 These regulations
were codified as Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-1 to 2.36 They
provide that an entity will qualify as an association taxable as a
corporation,37 if a predominance of six characteristics exists, caus-
ing the entity to more closely resemble a corporation than a part-
nership or trust.38 These six corporate characteristics are: (1) the
survivor of the original members. Id. at 420. Only the individual members were held liable to
third persons for professional misconduct. Id. The association was organized to collect all
professional receipts, and to pay clinic operating expenses, members' salaries, staff wages and
all payroll and federal corporation taxes. Id. The court held the entity to be a corporation for
federal tax purposes. Id. at 428.
33. Id.
34. Fisher, supra note 28, at 630. The Kintner regulations differed significantly from the
previous regulations accompanying I.R.C. § 7701 in their treatment of continuity of life and
centralization of management. Id. Prior to these amendments, the regulations did not require
that continuity of life be defined by the interpretation of dissolution under local law. Id. at
630-31. The Kintner regulations changed the meaning of centralized management by requir-
ing that the entity rely upon the continuing and exclusive authority of the persons in control
to make management decisions for the business. Id. at 631. Unlike the prior law, the Kintner
regulations "draw a distinction between the ability of a member to bind an organiza-
tion ...and the mutual agency relationship that exists in a partnership which, at least in
theory, enables each partner to bind the partnership notwithstanding that there may be an
internal management agreement." Id. (footnote omitted). The author also notes that,
"[t]hese Regulations- clearly a direct reaction by the Service to its inability to withhold
corporate classification from professional service organizations-constitute the very root of
the classification problem that remains with us today." Id. at 630 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. "No matter how the regulations are read, the bias toward partnership classifica-
tion is unmistakable .. . .More than any other aspect of these regulations, the preponder-
ance test puts a partnership thumb on the corporate resemblance scale." Id.
36. See supra note 11.
37. The Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, supra note 11, uses the term association. The Code
and regulations employ this term to refer to a business organization with corporate character-
istics sufficient to require its taxation as a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, supra note
11. "The inclusion of associations with corporations implies resemblance; but it is resem-
blance and not identity. The resemblance points to features distinguishing associations from
partnerships as well as from ordinary trusts." Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 357. This Note uses the
term corporation instead of association because corporation is the preferred term in the entity
classification literature.
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, supra note 11. The Code provides the following test: "An
unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association unless such organization
has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. In determining
whether an organization has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteris-
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existence of associates; (2) intent to carry on business for profit; (3)
centralized management; (4) continuity of life; (5) free transferabil-
ity of interests; and (6) limited liability..39
Two characteristics, the existence of associates and an intent to
carry on business for profit, are generally common to both partner-
ships and corporations and are not useful in distinguishing these
entities.40 The regulations thus indicate that the existence of a pre-
ponderance of the remaining four characteristics is required to tax
an entity as a corporation rather than as a partnership.41 One
tics, all characteristics common to both types of organizations shall not be considered." Id.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(3).
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -2, supra note 11.
40. Treas. Reg. § 3 0 1 . 7 701-2(a)(2), supra note 11. The Treasury Regulations discuss these
two characteristics as follows:
Some of the major characteristics of a corporation are common to trusts and
corporations, and others are common to partnerships and corporations ....
[C]haracteristics common to partnerships and corporations are not material in
attempting to distinguish between an association and a partnership ... since asso-
ciates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom are
generally common to both corporations and partnerships ....
Id.
41. Id. "[Tihe determination of whether an organization which has ... [associates and
the objective to carry on business for profit] is to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership
or as an association depends on whether there exists centralization of management, continu-
ity of life, free transferability of interests, and limited liability." Id.
An explanation of these last four characteristics is essential to an understanding of the
separate interests test. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, supra note 11.
Centralized Management exists in corporations where the management is concentrated
in the directors and the appointed officers.
An organization has centralized management if any person (or any group of persons
which does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make
the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the
organization was formed .... Centralized management means a concentration of
continuing exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of
the organization which do not require ratification by members of such organization.
Treas. Reg. § 3 01. 7 701-2(c)(1), (3), supra note 11. Shareholders are limited to choosing the
directors. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 176 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B.1. The exist-
ence of this corporate characteristic, therefore, is determined by whether the corporation is
managed representatively, i.e., by directors acting as the shareholders' representatives. Zuck-
man v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 738 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
Limited Liability exists where the individual members are not personally liable for the
debts of the corporation. "An organization has ... limited liability if under local law there is
no member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against the organization."
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1), supra note 11. Personal liability of a member exists where a
tort victim or a creditor has recourse to his personal assets when the assets of the organization
are insufficient to satisfy the claim. 524 F.2d at 740.
Continuity of Life exits where the substitution of members in an organization does not
effect a dissolution.
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court, 42 which has upheld the literal interpretation of these regula-
tions, has described them as a mechanical approach necessary "to
impart a degree of certainty to a subject otherwise fraught with
imponderables. '
4 3
While this mechanical and biased definition has limited the
availability of corporate fringe benefits, 44 it has also inspired the
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement,
resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution .. . . (2) For
purposes of this paragraph, dissolution of an organization means an alteration of the
identity of an organization by reason of a change in the relationship between its
members as determined under local law.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), supra note 11. The continuity of an entity, upon substitution of
one member for another, indicates that events personally affecting particular members do not
necessarily have effects on the entity. The entity stands regardless of the identity of its
particular members. 66 T.C. at 173.
Free Transferability of Interests is closely related to the corporate characteristic of
continuity of life.
Free transferability of interests [exists] ...if each of [the entity's] members or those
members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization have the
power, without the consent of other members to substitute for themselves in the
same organization a person who is not a member of the organization. In order for
this power of substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must be able,
without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substitute all the attrib-
utes of his interest in the organization . . . .Furthermore, although the agreement
provides for the transfer of a member's interest, there is no power of substitution and
no free transferability of interest if under local law a transfer of a member's interest
results in the dissolution of the old organization and the formation of a new
organization.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e), supra note 11. Except in cases where the restrictions of an
organization (i.e., rights of first refusal) provide otherwise, when continuity of life exists, the
individual member's ownership interest is freely transferable. Free transferability of interests,
therefore, means that a member's share of ownership in an entity can be disposed of without
reference to the wishes of the other members. The free transferability of "substantially all"
the shareholders' interests is generally necessary. 66 T.C. at 182. The Zuckman court had
previously determined that:
[S]o long as a member has the power, unconditional as between that member and
the remaining members, to fully substitute a non-member for himself in the organi-
zation, the existence of a mere formal or nominal condition will not prevent such
member's interest from being freely transferable within the meaning of the regula-
tion.
524 F.2d at 743.
In domestic entities, the characteristic of free transferability is determined by local law.
There is no power of substitution and no free transferability if, under the local law, the
transfer of an interest dissolves the old entity and forms a new one. See id. at 743-44.
42. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
43. Id. at 172. "The regulations discuss each major corporate characteristic separately,
and each apparently bears equal weight in the final balancing." Id. See infra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text.
44. One commentator notes:
The single purpose of the revision [i.e., of the Kintner regulations] was to prevent
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creative search for tax advantages available only to partnerships. 45
Many partnerships obtain tax advantages by the allocation of in-
come or losses to their individual partners. 46 This practice has
recently led taxpayers and the I.R.S. to reverse positions on the
issue of corporate classification, with the I.R.S. now seeking to
classify partnerships as corporations. 47 The Kintner regulations,
however, have remained the law; a law which courts, at least with
respect to domestic entities, have felt constrained to enforce. 48
Judicial adherence to the Kintner regulations, despite the new
I.R.S. preference for classification as corporations, is demonstrated
in Zuckman v. United States49 and Larson v. Commissioner.50
doctors and other professionals, for whom the ordinary business corporation form
had . . . been considered unsuitable, from qualifying their operating organiza-
tions . . . as corporations . . . . Doctors and other professionals have long since
ceased to be concerned with the 1960 regulations. Instead, they incorporate under
professional association laws that the states have tailored to their peculiar circum-
stances . . . . Although their purpose has evaporated, the 1960 regulations remain
in effect, stacking the cards in favor of partnership status.
Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an Old Issue, 79 Wis. L. REV. 989, 989
(1979).
The recently promulgated Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility. Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 324 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), includes a provision which seriously impairs the existing tax
benefits of incorporating professionals. Id. § 250(a) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 269(A)).
"The new law provides the I.R.S. with the necessary reallocation weapons, where the
professional service corporation is formed for the primary purpose of evading taxes or
securing retirement benefits not otherwise available. I.R.S. can reallocate any tax attributes
to employee-owners who own more than 10% of the professional service corporation."
PRENTICE HALL HANDBOOK ON THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL REsPONSIBILITY ACr OF 1982
REVENUE PROVISIONS § 213 (1982).
45. Fisher, supra note 28, at 633. The I.R.S. "[a]s a result of its single-minded determina-
tion to tax professional associations as partnerships," had unwittingly given taxpayers and
their "innovative tax counsel" the tax benefits of allocating their proportionate share of
partnership losses to offset personal income, thereby often significantly reducing personal
income and taxes. Id. Fisher indicates that the historical success of tax shelters is also due to
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960) which (prior to its reversal by Congress in the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.)) allowed partners to deduct partnership losses by their proportionate share of liabili-
ties for which no partner was personally liable. Fisher, supra note 28, at 633 n.23. See I.R.C.
§§ 465, 704(d) (1982) for limitations of these deductions promulgated under the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.
46. Fisher, supra note 28, at 633.
47. Id. See Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 745; Larson, 66 T.C. at 185. See also Eustice, The Tax
Reform Act of 1976: Corporate Changes Revisited, 33 TAX L. REV. 115, 127-30 (1977).
48. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of attempts at legisla-
tive change of the Kintner regulations.
49. 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
50. 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
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These two cases confirmed that, under the regulations, an entity's
tax status would be determined simply by looking for the remaining
four characteristics in the structure of the organization, thus pro-
tecting "organizations cast in the form of limited partnerships from
the dulled classification sword of the Service." 5' In Zuckman, the
court mechanically applied the Kintner regulations to find that a
real estate development group, organized as a limited partnership
with a corporation as the sole general partner, was taxable as a
partnership because no corporate characteristics existed. 52 The
court was presented with and rejected an innovative precursor to
the separate interests test.53 The government unsuccessfully urged
that the entity, organized under the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act (ULPA), was constructively owned by the general partner.5 4 It
was argued, therefore, that the corporate characteristics of central-
ized management55 and continuity of life56 existed in addition to
limited liability. The court, adhering to the letter of the regula-
tions, refused to look beneath the entity's structure at the unity of
controlling economic interests and to reclassify the limited partner-
ship as a corporation.5 7
Similarly, in Larson, the court applied the regulations to up-
hold partnership status for a United States limited partnership
whose sole general partner was a corporation.,5  A determinative
51. Fisher, supra note 28, at 633. One commentator refers to the recent period of
confusion in the area of entity classification of domestic limited partnerships as "[tihis decade
of uncertainty." Roberts, Simplification Symposium Overview: The Viewpoint of the Tax
Lawyer, 34 TAx L. REV. 5, 15 (1978-79).
52. 524 F.2d at 744.
53. See id. at 744-45.
54. Id. at 738-39.
55. Id. at 739.
56. Id. at 734.
57. Id. at 735, 738-39, 745. Specifically, the court found that continuity of life was not
present in the entity because "the mere reservation in the limited partnership agreement of a
power in the remaining general partners to continue the business on a general partner's
withdrawal, constitutes only a 'contingent continuity of existence,' insufficient to satisfy the
regulation's corporate standard." Id. at 735. The court then found that centralized manage-
ment was not present in the entity's structure since "[t]he express language of the regulation
neither directly nor otherwise contemplates application of a constructive ownership rule.
Absent such a rule . . . [the general partner's] interest in . . . [the partnership's] capital and
profits would ordinarily preclude a finding that the latter possessed centralized manage-
ment." Id. at 739. The court also found that the characteristics of limited liability and free
transferability of interests did not exist. Id. at 742, 744.
58. 66 T.C. at 173-86. In Larson, plaintiffs were owners of limited partnership interests
in two real estate syndicates set up under the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15501-15532 (West 1977). The sole general partner in each of these
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factor in the court's analysis was the nonexistence in the entity's
structure of the corporate characteristic of limited liability.5 The
court found that having a corporation as the general partner was
not merely a subterfuge to prevent the finding of limited liability; it
found, instead, that the corporation's existence had justifiable busi-
ness motives.60 The dissenting opinions argued that the majority
had "simplistically" applied the Kintner regulations to the facts of
the case without giving adequate consideration to the underlying
economic realities.6'
syndications was a corporation. The partnerships were found to possess the corporate charac-
teristics of centralized management and free transferability of interests and to lack the
corporate characteristics of continuity of life and limited liability. 66 T.C. at 185. They were
thus held taxable as partnerships as defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2). Id.
The court, in analyzing the nonexistence of limited liability stated that "the record
indicates that the limited partners did not use GHL [the general partner] as a screen to
conceal their own active involvement in the conduct of the business; far from being a rubber
stamp, GHL was the moving force in these enterprises." Id. at 181. The majority, although
criticized by the dissent for "mechanically" applying the Kintner regulations, appears to have
given some weight to the actual ownership structure of the entity, at least in determining the
nonexistence of the corporate characteristic of limited liability. Id.
Judge Dawson's concurring opinion stated: "over the years since the original adoption of
the Kintner regulations, the four basic tests created therein have become the established rules
through which the Commissioner [of the I.R.S.] on the one hand and tax planners on the
other have been able to operate with some degree of certainty. ... Id. at 186.
In his dissent, Judge Raum disagreed with what he saw as a "simplistic" and "mechani-
cal" application of the regulation to the facts at hand. Id. at 191-92. Judge Drennan agreed
with Judge Raum and, in a separate dissent, questioned the overall validity of the regula-
tions. Id. at 192. Judge Quealy, (dissenting) added that "it is the duty of the Court to decide a
case in accordance with the law, and where the law is clear, the regulations must give way to
the law." Id. at 202. He commented further that the regulations appeared to be based on
"erroneous concepts" and thus should not prevent the court from looking at the organization
as a whole rather than merely on the regulations' "formalistic standards." Id. at 208-09.
An earlier decision, Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974), classified an entity as a corporation by finding that two corporate character-
istics not enumerated in the regulations were significant, 494 F.2d at 1385. Subsequent courts
have not followed this decision. See, e.g., Zuckman, 524 F.2d at 745; Larson, 66 T.C. at 185.
59. Larson, 66 T.C. at 179-82.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 191. "A hospitable reading of those regulations-with a view to bringing the
result within the principles of Morrissey upon which the regulations were based-would lead
to a correct disposition of this case." Id. One author has commented that "[i]n the balancing
of equity and predictability, it is submitted that the dissenting judges failed to give due
weight to the need for predictability by taxpayers and the tax bar during the 15-year period
that the regulations were outstanding. And the Treasury must also be faulted in failing to
reflect its entirely justifiable dissatisfaction with the existing regulations by amending the
regulations." Roberts, supra note 51, at 15.
In its appeal, the government argues that a foreign entity is even more difficult to
classify than a domestic entity since the foreign laws are not analogous to the Uniform
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A recent Revenue Ruling, 75-19,62 pertaining to classification
of domestic entities is consistent with these courts' refusal to look
beyond the legal structure of the entity.63 This Revenue Ruling
determined that a partnership, formed by four domestic subsidi-
aries of a domestic parent corporation, was taxable as a partnership
since it did not possess a preponderance of corporate characteris-
tics.6 4 The Ruling made no reference to a separate interests or
unified economic interests analysis, which would have probably
changed the result. 5
Up to now, courts have resisted I.R.S. pressures to apply a less
mechanical interpretation of the Kintner regulations in order to
find that an unincorporated entity was taxable as a corporation.6
With regard to domestic entities, the conflict between the amend-
ment's original intent and the current I.R.S. desire to hamper tax
avoidance schemes has, for now, been decided in favor of strict
adherence to the letter of the regulations. 67
B. Foreign Entity Classification and Subpart F
Classification of foreign entities has been more complicated
than that of domestic entities because of the interrelationship be-
tween I.R.C. § 7701 and the laws affecting United States controlled
foreign entities,6 8 such as Subpart F69 of the I.R.C. The recent
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA). "Since these foreign laws create entities which do not track
our domestic forms, the entities fail to provide the concomitant guaranties [sic] that they are
economically and in practice functioning as labelled under foreign law." Appellate Brief for
Appellee at 28 n.13, MCA Inc. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd,
685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MCA Appellee Brief].
62. 1975-1 C.B. 382.
63. Fisher has commented that "[t]he pervasiveness of the four basic tests, as a general
rule, should limit the relevance of any additional factors to assisting in the determination of
whether corporate resemblance exists with respect to one or more of these characteristics."
Fisher, supra note 28, at 645. Another commentator suggests that "[flrom Revenue Ruling
75-19 it is clear that a taxpayer may choose the form of domestic organization to fit both his
business needs and his tax objectives. Where the taxpayer is willing to take on all the burdens
as well as the benefits connected with his choice in the foreign area, the same free choice
should prevail." Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 208.
64. Rev. Rul. 75-19, supra note 62, at 383.
65. See supra notes 98-147 and accompanying text.
66. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 191. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying
text.
67. Foreign Corporations-U.S. Income Taxation, 156-4th TAX MCMT. (BNA) Foreign
Income Portfolios at A-7 (1977). The actual language of the regulations, however, has not
changed, despite changes in the approach.
68. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 192-97.
69. For the definition and history of the Subpart F provision, see supra note 4 and infra
notes 85-97.
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introduction of the separate interests test by the I. R.S. in a Revenue
Ruling 70 and the test's treatment in one case7 1 has added inconsis-
tencies and complexities to foreign entity classification. 72
A juridical entity 73 established under foreign law was once
recognized as a corporation for United States tax purposes, without
reference to the criteria of the I.R.C. and its regulations.7 4 In 1954,
however, the United States Tax Court used the Morrissey character-
istics to find that a Venezuelan Sociedad anonima 7. was a corpora-
tion for United States tax purposes. 76 More recent cases and rulings
have gone further and held that another country's characterization
of its entity is irrelevant to that entity's United States tax classifica-
tion. 77 Revenue Ruling 73-254, 7 which confirmed the latter ap-
proach, is "almost redundant" in view of prior holdings. 79 This
ruling held that although an organization may have a different tax
status under foreign law than under United States law, the Code
governs for United States tax purposes.80
70. Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408.
71. MCA, 502 F. Supp. 838, rev'd, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 192 (general discussion of inconsistencies and
complexities in foreign entity classification).
73. A juridical entity is one which is established by and conformed to the laws and
practices of the country where it is established. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 765 (5th ed.
1979) (definition of juridical).
74. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 192. See also General Counsel's Memorandum
9067, 10-1 C.B. 337 (1931) (declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 67-406, 1967-2 C.B. 420, 424),
and General Counsel's Memorandum 18718, 1937-2 C.B. 476 (declared obsolete in Rev. Rul.
70-59, 1970-1 C.B. 280). In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), the Supreme
Court recognized that a sociedad en comandita (limited liability company) was a juridical
entity. Haussermann v. Burnet, 63 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir.), aJj'd, 289 U.S. 729 (1933) upheld
the separate status of a Philippine sociedad anonima (limited liability entity).
75. Sociedad anonima is defined as an anonymous company, one which is established
with limited liability. Buckley v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1312, 1324 (1954), aff'd, 231 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1956).
76. Id.
77. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 194-95. See also Arundel Corp. v. United States,
102 F. Supp. 1019, 1021-22 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Abbot Laboratories Int'l Co. v. United States, 160
F. Supp. 321, 328 (N.D. I11. 1958), afJ'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959) (for United
States income tax purposes, United States tax law governs, notwithstanding conflicting
foreign laws).
78. 1973-1 C.B. 613.
79. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 195.
80. Rev. Rul. 73-254, supra note 78, at 613. In Elot H. Raffety Farms, Inc. v. United
States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'g, 369 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mo. 1973), the
court made a perfunctory analysis to determine that a Mexican entity, sociedad de responsibi-
lidad limitada, an association with limited liability, was a corporation. 511 F.2d at 1239.
This short analysis implies that the court was either reluctant to accept the policy of Rev. Rul.
73-254 or that it believed "that limited liability is the deciding characteristic in finding
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One I.R.S. response to growing confusion in classifying foreign
entities for United States tax purposes was the issuance of Exhibit
500-7 of the Internal Revenue Manual, Guidelines on Foreign
Forms of Business Organization.8' Although only preliminary, Ex-
hibit 500-7 lists approximately two hundred forms of foreign busi-
ness organizations and attempts to classify many of them as either
partnerships or corporations.82 The I.R.S. is careful to point out
that this list is not to be "construed as the position of the Service"
and that classification depends on the circumstances of each case.
83
Just as taxpayers eventually sought noncorporate classification of
domestic entities for its tax benefits, United States taxpayers have
attempted to circumvent the classification of their foreign entities as
corporations in order to evade Subpart F coverage.
84
corporate status for a foreign juridical entity." Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 196.
Reference is made in the case that a "[tiaxpayer may not escape liability in a foreign nation's
courts under one theory and then seek an advantage in this nation's courts by contending it6
opposite." 511 F.2d at 1239.
81. Reprinted in 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (AUDIT) (CCH) Ch. 673 at 7283-58.
82. Id. Some examples of this are: Bolivia-Sociedad anonima (SA) ...Corporation;
Greece-Public Company Limited ...Corporation; Italy-Societd in accomandita per azioni
(SApA) . . .Quasi-Corporation; Netherlands-Beslogen Vennootschap (BV) . . .Corpora-
tion-Naamioze Vennootschap (NV) ...Corporation. Id. at 7283-58 to 61.
83. Id. at 7283-24. See also Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 196.
The status of foreign entities under tax treaties is another factor to be considered in
classifying them. In Rev. Rul. 76-435, 1976-2 C.B. 490, a United States limited partnership
was classified as an association taxable as a corporation under the German tax treaty. This
classification was determined by the finding of a preponderance of corporate characteristics.
Recent private rulings, Private Letter Rul. No. 7852027 (Sept. 27, 1978), rev'd, Private
Letter Rul. No. 7935019 (May 29, 1979) and also Private Letter Rul. No. 7908004 (Aug. 28,
1978), amended by Private Letter Rul. No. 7937054 (June 14, 1979), have applied the
Kintner regulations to classify two German Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Hajtung (GmbH)
as associations for purposes of German treaty provisions and the United States tax laws. Both
private letter rulings looked at the relationship of the members, and one of them, Private
Letter Rul. No. 7908004 (Aug. 28, 1978), applied Rev. Rul. 77-214 in finding the entity to be
a corporation. In general, however, tax conventions between the United States and foreign
countries may establish a different definition of a "corporation" for tax treaty purposes. This
definition is primarily used in characterizing the nature of payments made to the owners of
the entity. U.S. Tax Treaties with the European Member Countries- Corporate Aspects, 41-
3rd TAX MGMT. (BNA) Foreign Income Portfolios at A-10 (1974).
84. Some general examples of the Service's attempts to prevent tax avoidance are:
I.R.C. §§ 269 (acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax), 367 (transfers to
controlled foreign corporations), 482 (intercompany pricing), 551-558 (foreign per-
sonal holding companies), 679 (taxing grantors on income from certain foreign
trusts), 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) (directed at foreign mutual funds conducting business in the
United States), 904(f) (effecting a recapture of specified foreign losses), subpart F
(dealing generally with foreign base companies), 1246 (concerning foreign invest-
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Before the enactment of Subpart F in 1962,85 United States
shareholders could not be taxed on the income of a CFC until the
income was repatriated in the form of dividends.86 This enabled
United States shareholders to avoid taxes by deferring payment of
dividends from their foreign corporations. In a 1961 tax message, 87
President Kennedy called for the removal of this type of tax defer-
ral:
Recently more and more enterprises organized abroad by Ameri-
can firms have arranged their corporate structures-aided by
artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary regarding
intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maxi-
mize the accumulation of profits in the tax haven-so as to
exploit the multiplicity of foreign tax systems and international
agreements in order to reduce sharply or eliminate completely
their tax liabilities both at home and abroad.8
To eliminate this type of tax avoidance by deferral, the Revenue
Act of 1962, through Subpart F, specified the types of income
which would be taxable when earned.89 Subpart F ircome includes
income arising from insurance abroad of United States risks, from
ment companies), 1248 (sale or exchange of stock in controlled foreign corpora-
tions), 1249 (recharacterizing income on patent transfers), 1491 (imposing an excise
tax on transfers to foreign entities).
Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 209 n.148.
85. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a) 76 Stat. 96,, 1006-27 (codified at
I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1982)).
86. Controlled Foreign Corporations, Sec. 956, 232-2d TAX MGMT. (BNA) Foreign In-
come Portfolios at A-I (1977). Before the enactment of Subpart F, tax deferral was possible
because shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation were only taxed on the earnings and
profits of the corporation when a dividend was received by the domestic parent. If the
controlled foreign corporation decided to accumulate or reinvest the earnings in the foreign
country rather than make distribution, the United States shareholder was not taxed. General
Elec. Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 730, 734 n.8 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also Koehring Co. v.
United States, 583 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1978).
87. President Kennedy's tax message to Congress on April 20, 1961, 1962 U.S. CODE &
AD. NEws 3381 [hereinafter cited as Kennedy Tax Message] (cited in Estate of Lovett v.
United States, 621 F.2d 1130, 1136 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
88. Kennedy Tax Message, supra note 87, at 3381.
89. Id. "Tax haven operations was a reference to a certain category of activities such as
trading, licensing, and insurance which could be easily organized such that the resulting
income would be collected and taxed in certain countries with low tax rates." General
Electric, 610 F.2d at 734 n.9. See also Controlled Foreign Corporations-Sec. 955, 109-2nd
TAX MGMT. (BNA) Foreign Income Portfolios at A-1 to A-5 (1970) (discontinued due to code
amendment); Foreign Personal Holding Companies, 103-2nd TAX MGMT. (BNA) Foreign
Income Portfolios at A-1 to A-10 (1978).
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passive investments, and from sales and service subsidiaries sepa-
rately incorporated from the producing companies.90
Subpart F income, however, is limited to the income of a
"related person" 9' of a foreign corporation controlled by United
States shareholders.9 2 The I.R.C. defines a "related person," with
respect to a CFC, 3 as a corporation which controls or is controlled
by the CFC, or a corporation which is controlled by the same
person(s) which control the CFC . 4 The United States controlled
90. Kennedy Tax Message, supra note 87, at 3382. I.R.C. § 953 (1982) defines insurance
risk as "[i]ncome of a controlled foreign corporation [which derives] from premiums or other
consideration for reinsurance of, or the issuing of insurance or annuity contracts on, property
in or residents of the Ur.ted States." 6 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) I 4382G.01 (1982).
Passive investments are assets which generate passive income (e.g., interest, dividends and
royalties). Kennedy Tax Message, supra note 87, at 3305. Subpart F income includes income
from passive investments which have been transferred to a controlled foreign corporation
with the intent of avoiding United States taxation on their investment income. Id. at 3385.
The I.R.S.'s intention is to shift the income from sales and service subsidiaries out of the
domestic parent and into the foreign controlled corporation. Id. at 3386-87. Congress has
amended the definition of Foreign Base Company Income to include "foreign base company
oil related income for the taxable year (determined under subsection (h) and reduced as
provided in subsection (b)(5)). Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 212(a), 1982 U.S. CODE CONc. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 324 (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 954(a)(5)). See also id. § 212(d), (b)(2), (c) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 954(b)(4), (8), 954(h)).
91. I.R.C. § 954 defines a "related person" as follows:
For purposes of this section, a person is a related person with respect to a controlled
foreign corporation, if-
(A) Such person is an individual, partnership, trust, or estate which controls the
controlled foreign corporation;
(B) Such person is a corporation which controls, or is controlled by, the controlled
foreign corporation; or
(C) Such person is a corporation which is controlled by the same person or persons
which control the controlled foreign corporation.
I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (1982).
92. Subpart F imposes special tax treatment only on a "controlled foreign corporation."
I.R.C. § 957 (1982).
More specifically, a CFC is a foreign corporation where the total combined voting
power of more than 50% of all qualified stock is actually (I.R.C. § 958(a) (1982)) or
constructively (I.R.C. § 958(b) (1982)) owned by United States shareholders on any day of
the foreign corporation's taxable year (I.R.C. § 957(a) (1982)). See I.R.C. § 957(b) (1982) for
special 25% rule for corporations which insure United States interests.
For CFC purposes, stock actually owned is defined as "(A) Stock owned directly, and (B)
stock owned with the application of paragraph (2). (2) Stock Ownership Through Foreign
Entities-For purposes of subparagraph (B) paragraph (1) stock owned, directly or indi-
rectly, by or for a foreign corporation . . . shall, for purposes of applying such sentence, be
treated as actually owned by such person." I.R.C. § 958(a) (1982).
93. See supra note 3.
94. I.R.C. § 954(d)(3)(B)-(C) (1982). See supra note 91 for full I.R.C. definition of
related person.
218 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:202
foreign entity which is found to be a partnership is not taxable as a
corporation and therefore avoids the tax disadvantages of Subpart F
treatment. To prevent tax avoidance by having entities attempt
classification as partnerships, the I.R.S. introduced the separate
interests test in Revenue Ruling 77-214.15 The separate interests test
not only fills the Subpart F gap 96 but also calls for a more flexible
application of the I.R.C. corporate characteristics."
Revenue Ruling 77-214 is the first official pronouncement in
which the I.R.S. looked beyond the legal structure of a foreign
entity.9 8 The Revenue Ruling and the results of its application are
not paralleled in the area of domestic entity classification. 99
The subject of the ruling was a Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter
Haftung (GmbH) 00 owned by two German subsidiaries which, in
turn, were wholly-owned by a United States parent corporation.
The entity classification for United States tax purposes began with
an examination of the legal relationships among the parties,101 pur-
suant to Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-1 and Revenue Ruling 73-
254.102 The characteristics common to both corporations and part-
nerships were not included in the analysis, because the ruling noted
that they were characteristics of a GmbH under German law. 10 3
The GmbH was found to have the corporate characteristics of
centralized management and limited liability. 0 4 A "straightfor-
ward" application of the Kintner regulations would have made the
existence of the two remaining characteristics, free transferability
of interests and continuity of life dispositive. The GmbH's memo-
95. Supra note 8, at 408.
96. It appears that the interaction between I.R.C. § 7701 and Subpart F in some cases
provides tax deferral results which are unsatisfactory to the I.R.S. The application of the
separate interests test changes this outcome by reinterpreting existing law. See infra notes 98-
147 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408-09. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying
text.
99. See supra notes 26-67 and accompanying text.
100. GmbH is translated as an association with liability. AKTIENGESETZ 1965; THE GERMAN
STOCK CORPORATION LAw 493 (R. Mueller & E. Galbraith trans., eds. 1966).
101. Supra note 8, at 408.
102. Supra note 78. The I.R.S held that, although the local law of the foreign jurisdictions
must be applied to determine the legal relationship among members of an entity, the Code
and Regulations sections of I.R.C. § 7701 will be applied to determine the taxable nature of
the entity. Id.
103. Supra note 8, at 408-09.
104. Id. at 408.
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randum of association '05 specifically provided for "dissolution upon
the occasion of the bankruptcy of a quotaholder [shareholder] and
for no transfer of quotas without the prior written approval of all
quotaholders," 106 thereby implying that continuity of life or trans-
ferability of interests did not exist. The GmbH fell into the partner-
ship category, at least superficially.
The ruling, however, proceeded to look at the relationship of
the parties.10 7 The I.R.S. found that transferability of interests
existed, reasoning that "since two wholly-owned domestic subsidi-
aries own . . . [one hundred percent] of the quotas of the GmbH, it
is apparent that the controlling parent could make all the transfer
-decisions for its wholly-owned subsidiaries, despite any provision in
the memorandum of association that might indicate otherwise."108
The ruling similarly found that continuity of life existed. "[B]oth
quotaholders are wholly owned by the same corporate parent-
. . . [therefore] there are no separate interests to compel dissolu-
tion should an event of dissolution occur." 109 The ruling, by finding
the nonexistence of separate interests among the GmbH's share-
holders, concluded that two of the corporate characteristics of con-
tinuity of life and free transferability of interests were present even
though the legal documents of the GmbH provided otherwise." 0
Prior to the issuance of 77-214, most international tax counsel
assumed that the United States tax classification of a foreign entity
would be made by mechanical adherence to the criteria set forth in
the I.R.C. and its regulations. " As a result of the separate interests
test, international tax counsel must now carefully analyze not only
the legal structure of a United States controlled foreign entity under
the Kintner regulations, but also its ownership." 2
Revenue Ruling 77-214 was followed by the district court in
MCA Inc. v. United States,' 3 where the court looked beyond the
105. A GmbH's memorandum of association is similar to the United States articles of
association. See id. at 408-09.
106. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 200. See Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408.
107. Supra note 8, at 409.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 200.
112. That Rev. Rul. 77-214 was issued only three months before the I.R.S. assessed MCA
for additional taxes is not seen as a coincidence by some. See MCA Appellant Brief, supra
note 1, at 24 n.26.
113. 502 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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surface of the corporation's structure to its controlling economic
interests. " 4 Both MCA Inc. (MCA) and Paramount Pictures Corpo-
ration (Paramount) are major United States producers of motion
picture films." 5 In 1970,116 Paramount and MCA formed a joint
venture to distribute their films internationally." 7 The joint ven-
ture was in the form of a Dutch corporation, Cinema International
Corporation, N.V. (CIC), with principal offices in Amsterdam." 8
Paramount and MCA each owned forty-nine percent of CIC's
stock; the remaining two percent was held by Stichting, a Nether-
lands trust fund established for the benefit of CIC employees.' '
CIC owned a ninety-five percent interest in the local distribution
outlets.'2 0 The remaining five percent was held by Proetus, B.V., a
Netherlands corporation wholly owned by Stichting, the CIC em-
ployee trust fund.' 2 ' Stichting's holdings were made up entirely of
CIC and Proetus stock. 122 Thus, Stichting and CIC together owned
one hundred percent of the local distribution outlets. 123
Film distribution in foreign countries requires that the market-
ing, servicing and other related activities 24 be conducted predomi-
114. Id. at 846.
115. Id. at 839-40. Films by both MCA and Paramount are regularly distributed through-
out the world. Approximately 50% of revenues from film distribution in the industry is
derived from foreign distribution of United States films. M. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRIES 74
(1978). For 1972 and 1973, the pertinent years for the MCA case, the gross income of United
States Major Motion Picture Film Companies from foreign film distribution was U.S.$388.8
and U.S.$415.5 million. THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 402 (T. Balio ed. 1976). Distribution
gross from domestic markets was U.S.$426.4 and U.S.$390.5 million. Id. For additional
background on MCA, see MCA: Superstar, 144 FORBES, Nov. 1, 1974, at 20; Schayten, How
MCA Rediscovered Movieland's Golden Lode, FORTUNE, Nov. 1976, at 122; Reshaping a
Sluggish MCA, Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1981, at 72-73.
116. THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY, supra note 115, at 408.
117. The joint venture was formed to engage more efficiently and economically in interna-
tional film distribution. 502 F. Supp. at 840. For a detailed survey of the legal and financial
aspects of foreign film distribution, see M. MAYER, supra note 115, at 74-80. See also THE
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY, supra note 115, at 387-409. For a general overview, see P.
BAUMGARTEN & M. LEAvy, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF FINANCING MOTION PICTURES
(1976); D. LEEDY, MOTION PICTURE DISTRIBUTION, AN ACCOUNTANT'S PERSPEcIVE (1980).
118. 502 F. Supp. at 840.
119. Id. See infra note 134 and accompanying text for a discussion of fiduciary roles in the
Netherlands.
120. 502 F. Supp. at 844.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Activities related to film distribution include negotiation with exhibitors, and adver-
tising the motion pictures within the foreign country. See M. MAYER, supra note 115, at 74-
80.
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nantly in the country of distribution. 125 Because mere branch offices
of a foreign corporation are often the object of discrimination,126
CIC established each outlet as a separate entity, formed and tax-
able under the local laws. 12 7 In addition, the outlets were structured
as partnerships to avoid United States taxes on foreign controlled
corporations. 12 8
The court agreed that the distribution outlets were structured
to have more noncorporate than corporate characteristics and were
classifiable as partnerships pursuant to Treasury Regulation §
301.7701-2.129 It went on, however, to consider the government's
argument that the local outlets' structure and method of operation
125. 502 F. Supp. at 840.
126. Id. Local law sometimes bars foreign corporations from engaging in film distribu-
tion. Id. Often foreign corporations are discriminated against in not being considered eligible
for membership in the local film board. Id. Another difficulty is their inability to comply
with local law and regulations. Id. Foreign film distributors may also be subject to unfavor-
able quotas. Id. See, e.g., M. MAYE, supra note 115, at 78. "A leading impediment to
foreign distribution is a collection of financial and legal measures imposed in foreign jurisdic-
tions-frequently aimed at preventing or limiting remittances of net proceeds of U.S. films to
the United States . . . . Vast sums, for instance in India and Pakistan, remain earned but not
remitted." Id. at 77.
In the motion picture industry there are three main problems related to interna-
tional trade in films. The first is an import tax levied on imported films to discour-
age their use; alternatively tax rebates are given to theaters for the showing of
domestic films. Another concern is dubbing requirements. In some cases local
laboratories are required to do dubbing work. In some cases dubbing into local
language is prohibited to reduce competitiveness of foreign films. Finally, some
countries impose quantitative restrictions on the number of days or number of
foreign films which can be shown in domestic theatres.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GOV'T INVENTORY OF SELECTED IMPEDIMENTS
TO TRADE IN SERVICES app. at 6-7 (1981). See Cohen & Morante, Elimination of Non Tariff
Barriers to Trade in Services: Recommendations for Future Negotiations, 13 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 495, 500 (1981). See generally Comment, Liberalization of International Trade in
the Service Sector: Threshold Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the GATT, 5
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 384-87 (1981-82).
127. 502 F. Supp. at 840. "These outlets distribute the films in their respective geographic
territories, performing such tasks as importing, checking, storing, and distributing film
prints, arranging for advertising and promotion of films, and all other aspects of local film
distribution." Id.
128. Id. In its reply brief, MCA claimed an "undisputed legal right" to structure the
distributorships as partnerships. Quoting Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F.2d 809, 810 (2d. Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), MCA argued that it was within its
rights to avoid taxation, in the absence of sham or fraud. MCA Appellant Brief, supra note 1,
at 11. Classification as a corporation would make the outlets a "related person" with respect
to CIC while classification as a partnership would not. See supra notes 91-97 and accompany-
ing text.
129. 502 F. Supp. at 843. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for the I.R.S.
definition of corporate characteristics.
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"so closely parallels that of a corporation as to defeat their nominal
characterization as 'partnerships.' 1130 The government's main ar-
gument was that "while the local outlets are made to appear as if
they are owned and controlled by two separate interests, CIC and
Proetus, there is no meaningful possibility that either of these inter-
ests would ever act independently of the other." 131 The court
agreed, finding that, although there was an intent to create the
appearance that the outlets were owned by separate and indepen-
dent partners, CIC and Proetus, the actual operations of these
partners were "sufficiently interwoven as to cast doubt on their
separateness and independence." 132 By applying the separate inter-
ests test, the court found two corporate characteristics, continuity
of life and free transferability of interests, to be present in the
outlets. 133 Twelve of these outlets also possessed one of the other two
distinguishing corporate characteristics, limited liability. 34 These
130. 502 F. Supp. at 843.
131. Id. at 844.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 846.
134. Id. at 847. In analyzing CIC's structure, the court first noted that two of the directors
of CIC, Bluhdorn and Wasserman (who were the chief executive officers of Paramount and
MCA respectively), were also two of the three trustees of Stichting, the third trustee being
jointly chosen by them. ld. at 844. The court noted that Proetus was merely a conveyance of
Stichting. In a detailed analysis of the Articles of Association of the trust, the court discovered
that the trustees had "enormous discretion in the operation of the Trust," and in the
disposition of the assets. Id. at 845. The court further found a lack of "separate interests"
between CIC and Stichting existed by determining that the stock held by the Trust could not
be sold without CIC's approval. Id.
The court found that if it were in the Trust's interest to sell its stock, two outcomes
would be possible. Wasserman and Bluhdorn, as the two controlling trustees of Stichting,
would simply refrain from initiating a sale of the stock. Even if Stichting's trustees did
consider selling, CIC's interests in the stock were carefully protected by using "an elaborate
system of clearances" giving them, inter alia, rights of first and second refusal. Id.
Before selling stock to a third party, Stichting's trustees had to provide CIC with a
written offer at a price set by a predetermined formula. In addition to the right of first
refusal, CIC was entitled to purchase the stock if a bona-fide offer was made by a third party.
And, if CIC again failed to act, the Trust provided that the sale to such third party must be
made within sixty days from CIC's second refusal or the trustees would not be permitted to
make the sale. Id. The court found that the Trust's responsibilities to CIC and the degree of
control which both entities could potentially exercise, the one on the other, made them "so
interwoven as to represent a single interest." Id. at 845-46. See MCA Appellant Brief, supra
note 1, at 35-37 for an opinion of the duties and liabilities of a trustee (bestuurder) of a
foundation (stichting) under Netherlands law. The Trust's two percent interest in CIC was
viewed as crucially important in resolving the outcome of any deadlock which might exist
between MCA and Paramount as joint venturers. 502 F. Supp. at 845. It also noted that
CIC's interest in controlling the Trust by means of an "interlocking directorate" prevented
outside interference with the mutual dependency of the Trust and CIC. Id. The court also
found that the duty of the trustees to maximize the value of the Trust's assets was not
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twelve outlets were then classifiable as corporations under I.R.C. §
7701, and therefore were related persons within the meaning of
Subpart F.135 The combined income of these twelve outlets repre-
sented over seventy percent of CIC's entire gross income. 13 As a
result, CIC, which was a controlled foreign corporation under the
Code, 137 was required under Subpart F to report all of its outlets'
gross income when earned. 138 The court therefore upheld the I.R.S.
assessment of MCA for the taxes due on the earnings of CIC's
twenty-nine 139 distribution outlets. 140
The Ninth Circuit, reversing the district court's opinion, 14 1
held that the distributorships were classifiable as partnerships since
inconsistent with their duties as directors of CIC. Id. Furthermore, "tihe meetings of the
trustees were normally held either immediately before or after the board meetings of CIC.
These meetings were generally held in a hotel room or lobby where the CIC board had met
and lasted less than an hour." Id. at 844.
Once the court had determined that a single interest existed, it found that the distribu-
torships necessarily had to be viewed as corporations. The approach taken was very briefly
dealt with by the court:
The government contends that the corporate characteristics of "free transferability
of interests" is present because if either CIC or Proetus had wished to sell its interest
in a local outlet, the other would not have objected or interfered. Similarly, as to the
"continuity of life" if "the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or
expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the organization." The
government maintains that if no separate interests exist which would demand
termination upon the ocurence of one of these events, then a local outlet might well
survive such occurrences-again, as would a corporation.
Id. at 846. The court extended the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 77-214. See supra notes 98-112 and
accompanying text. The court, after quoting Justice Holmes, agreed with the intent of the
Ruling, stating that it was necessary to "delve below the mere formal veneer of the so-called
'partnership' entity to consider its actual structure and manner of operation and decision-
making . . . . [U]pon close examination, the partnership veil of the local outlets proves
rather evanescent." 502 F. Supp. at 847. The court upheld the IRS's additional tax assessment
of U.S.$868,170, denying MCA a refund and granting the government's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
135. 502 F. Supp. at 847. See supra note 5.
136. 502 F. Supp. at 847. The de minimus rule at the time of the MCA case provided that
if the FBCI was less than 30 % of the CFC's gross income, no part of the gross income would
be treated as income to the FBCI under Subpart F. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834,
§ 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1006-10. The current minimum is 10%. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) (1982).
See supra note 5.
137. See supra note 5.
138. 502 F. Supp. at 847.
139. The lower court incorrectly states that there was a total of 21 outlets. 502 F. Supp. at
843. MCA's counsel and the Ninth Circuit state that there are 29 outlets. MCA Appellant
Brief, supra note 1, at 8 n.ll; MCA v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 1982).
140. 502 F. Supp. at 843.
141. MCA, 685 F.2d at 1105.
224 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:202
CIC and Stichting were separate interests as a matter of law. 142 The
court, analyzing the ownership structure of the distributorships,
emphasized the fiduciary role of Stichting's Board of Trustees.143 It
found that, while there was a "commonality of. . . business inter-
ests, there is a potential for legitimate conflict of interest between
[CIC and Stichting] . . . in the management of the distributor-
ships." 144 The court concluded that, "although we agree with the
government that CIC and Stichting are likely, as a practical mat-
ter, always to act in concert in their management of the distributor-
ships, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that their interests will
never diverge." 145
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, distinguished the facts of MCA
from those in Revenue Ruling 77-214. 14 Arguably, this decision
does not preclude the application of the separate interests test in a
factual pattern where there is no possibility of legitimate conflict of
interest among the related parties. The court noted, however, that
legislative change in this area would be more appropriate. 147
142. Id. at 1104. The court began its analysis by recognizing that "CIC and Stichting,
unlike the corporations in Rev. Rul. 77-214, are beneficially owned by parties with separate
and distinct economic interests-CIC principally by MCA and Paramount, and Stichting
personally by individual employees of GIG." Id. at 1103. The court further noted that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty of the Stichting trustees was one which "regardless of the breadth of
their discretion . . . [is] a duty to exercise their powers in good faith and without concern for
their own personal interests or for those of third parties." Id. Since the parties had not given
written notice of intent to raise Netherlands law of fiduciaries, the court was "under no
obligation to apply Netherlands law." Id. at n. 12. Citing the law of the forum state, the court
held that, under California law, the fiduciary duty of trustees was one which a court would
review for unreasonableness, arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith. Id. at 1103. The
court, in reaching its decision, reasoned that
MCA and Paramount may have gone to the brink of permissible control over
Stichting; but the government offers no evidence that the Messrs. Wasserman and
Bluhdorn [sic], in their capacities as Stichting Trustees, have gone over the
brink . . . . Nor do we think that the tax consequences of a legitimate business
transaction should turn on an unsupported assumption that certain parties to the
transaction will act in breach of their fiduciary duties and, indeed, unlawfully.
Thus, we conclude that the disputed provisions, which restrict the transferability of
distributorship interests and limit the continuity of distributorship life, have legal
effect. We hold that under § 301.7701-2 the distributorships must be classified as
partnerships for domestic tax purposes.
Id. at 1104.
143. Id. at 1103-04.
144. Id. at 1103.
145. Id. at 1104.
146. Id. at 1103.
147. Id. at 1105. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
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II. CRITICISM OF THE SEPARATE INTERESTS TEST
While the outcome of the application of the separate interests
test may be desirable from the viewpoint of both the I.R.S. and the
United States government,148 the test itself lacks consistency and
logical cohesiveness. 49 An application of the separate interests test
requires the finding of a single economic interest in the I.R.C.
§ 7701 characteristics of transferability of interests and continuity
of life; it does not do so, however, for the remaining four character-
istics.150 As one commentator notes,' 5 1 this incomplete application
casts doubt upon the logic of the test's analysis, since the application
of the test to the remaining characteristics may lead to a different
result.152 A finding of a single economic interest in an entity's
ownership apparently has no effect on the existence of the corporate
characteristic of limited liability. An entity attempting classifica-
tion as a partnership will seek to avoid the appearance of limited
liability in its ownership structure. The finding of a unified eco-
nomic interest among the entity's members will arguably have no
effect on the continuing nonexistence of limited liability.
The test's application to the characteristics of joint profit mo-
tive, centralized management, and associates, however, could de-
termine the outcome of the classification. 53 Certain unresolved
problems arise when the separate interests test is applied to these
characteristics. Associates and their joint motive for profit are
deemed to be the two essential characteristics of all business entit-
ies, other than the so-called one man corporation and the sole
proprietorship. 5 4 The term "associates" implies a plurality of own-
ership. Where the ownership of the entity is found to be a single
economic interest, there is arguably an absence of associates and
148. The application of the test appears thus far to have generated greater tax revenue in
both cases. See MCA, 502 F. Supp. at 847; Rev. Rul. 77-214, supra note 8, at 408.
149. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 201.
150. Id. at 201-02.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 148-51 and infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
153. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 201-02.
154. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), supra note 11.
Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are essential
characteristics of all organizations engaged in business for profit (other than the so-
called one-man corporation and the sole proprietorship), the absence of either of
these essential characteristics will cause an arrangement among co-owners of prop-
erty for the development of such property for the separate profit of each not to be
classified as an association.
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their joint motive for profit. This absence could result in the entity's
being classified as a branch of the parent corporation rather than as
a partnership or corporation.155 A branch, like a partnership, falls
outside the Subpart F provisions. 5 6
A different method of finding the existence of associates has
been recommended by one commentator. 1 5 7 Under this method, the
Code's requirement for associates can be met if the foreign entity
has associates "at any level, either at the level of its immediate
owners, its intermediate corporate owners or the ultimate share-
holder level."s This approach, therefore, looks for the existence of
associates throughout the corporate structure rather than at the
level of the particular entity to be classified. 59 This broader method
would appear to mitigate problems which arise when a more com-
plete application of the separate interests test is used. The I.R.S. has
thus far not attempted to clarify what would be the outcome of the
test's application to these characteristics. 6 0 It apparently became
aware of the problems of applying the separate interests test to the
155. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 202. A counterargument could be made that a
single economic interest exists among all the associates, and therefore that the existence of the
characteristic (and a joint profit motive) is preserved when the test is applied. Id.
156. A branch is not a "related party" as defined by I.R.C. § 954(d)(3). See supra note 91.
See also Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 208.
157. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 207-08.
158. Id. at 208.
It has also been suggested that a foreign entity be treated as fulfilling the require-
ment for associates if it has the capacity for associates. That is, if the foreign
organizational form can be established with either one or more than one owner, it
would be considered to satisfy the associates test even though, in fact, it had only
one owner.
Id. at 208 n.144 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 207-08.
160. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 202-06. The government's brief in MCA
argues that the outlets did not have centralized management. Quoting Zuckman, the brief
notes:
although CIC owns 95 % of the outlets, and clearly operates them, this is not, under
Zuckman, what centralized management means . . . . [I]f there is a great number
of partners, there is a presumption that the managing partner acts in . . . a repre-
sentative way, and centralization of management is present. When there are few
partners, or where one partner has de facto control, this "would in itself effectively
rule out any possibility of representative management."
MCA Appellees Brief, supra note 61, at 23 (citations omitted). The government made this
argument because it felt that de facto control of the outlets by MCA and Paramount through
their control of CIC, Stichting and Proetus bestowed the characteristics of continuity of life
and free transferability of interests upon the outlets. See supra note 41 for further discussion
of centralized management.
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characteristics of associates and joint profit motive soon after the
publication of Revenue Ruling 77-214, but no satisfactory resolu-
tion has been offered. 16 1
161. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 210. The I.R.S. issued five Private Letter
Rulings: Private Letter Rul. No. 743060 (July 28, 1977), Private Letter RUl. No. 7743077
(July 29, 1977), Private Letter Rul. No. 7747083 (Aug. 26, 1977), Private Letter Rul. No.
7748038 (Aug. 31, 1977), Private Letter Rul. No. 7802012 (Oct. 11, 1977), all concerning
foreign entities owned by United States parent corporations. For a summary of these and
other private letter rulings through November 21, 1979, see Tax Section Report, supra note 1,
at 222-38. In all of these rulings, the I.R.S. concluded that the parent corporation was either
the beneficial or true owner of the entire foreign interest and therefore lacked both associates
and anyone with whom to divide the profits, the second essential corporate characteristic. See
id. Therefore, the entity was to be treated as a foreign branch of the domestic parent. If this
approach had been consistently applied, it would have led the I.R.S. to refuse to recognize
the existence of United States wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries altogether.
On November 11, 1977, one month after the issuance of the last letter ruling, the I.R.S.
issued new rulings to the same five taxpayers, withdrawing the previous rulings, offering only
that the prior holdings are "not in accord with the views of the Service concerning the proper
tax classification of foreign organizations that have only one beneficial owner." Private Letter
Rul. No. 7806055 (Nov. 11, 1977); Private Letter Rul. No. 7806056 (Nov. 11, 1977); Private
Letter Rul. No. 7806057 (Nov. 11, 1977); Private Letter Rul. No. 7806058 (Nov. 11, 1977);
Private Letter Rul. No. 7806062 (Nov. 11, 1977).
The taxpayers were told that the foreign entities would be treated as corporations
beginning four months from the issuance of the withdrawal. Tax Section Report, supra note
1, at 203.
Subsequent letter rulings have not provided further clarification. An Italian Societiz a
responsibilitiz limitata (S.r.l.) was held to be an association taxable as a corporation where it
was jointly owned by a United States corporation and its wholly-owned United States
subsidiary. Private Letter Rul. No. 7841008 (June 20, 1978). In this letter ruling, another
wholly-owned United States subsidiary of the same parent joined as a quotaholder. The
I.R.S. found that no separate interests existed to compel dissolution and, therefore, found
continuity of life. Id. Similarly, since the ruling found that if the United States parent had the
power to make all transfer decisions for members, free transferability of interests existed. Id.
The ruling found that centralized management existed as well, since the societ6 was managed
by a board of directors whose decisions did not have to be ratified by the other members. Id.
It is interesting to note that the ruling applied the separate interests test only to the character-
istics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests, although it appears to have been
indirectly applied to centralized management because of the facts. Id.
In dealing with the retroactive application of the ruling to 1974 and 1975 taxable years,
the ruling commented that the "I.R.S. [will not] grant relief under Section 7805(b) ...be-
cause [the parent corporation did not] request [it and the] ...ruling . . .[was not] issued
until more than one year after ...[its] conversion." Id. This comment seems to imply a
desire on the Service's part to penalize those who fail to ask for timely determinations. For
similar decisions, see Private Letter Rul. No. 7843006 (July 18, 1978), where the ruling
looked at the common ownership of a Greek limited liability company (EPE) to classify it as a
corporation; Private Letter Rul. No. 7936050 (June 8, 1979), where the domestic parent was
found to have "substantially all of the interests" of the United States parent wholly-owned
new company (a Chilean limitada, limited liability company) upon liquidation of the old
company (a Chilean joint-stock company); the new company was held to be a corporation for
federal tax purposes. Id. There is one ruling where separate interests test did not apply to
similar facts and a conflicting ruling was given. Private Letter Rul. No. 7934096 (May 24,
228 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:202
The application of the separate interests test to the corporate
characteristic of centralized management is less complex. The find-
ing of a single economic interest implies that there is control of the
entity by a unified management. It could be argued therefore that
the corporate characteristic of centralized management exists if the
foreign entity's management is controlled by such a unified eco-
nomic interest.16 2
Taxpayers have not failed to notice the problems with the
separate interests test. The large number of requests for private
letter rulings to clarify Revenue Ruling 77-214 indicates the consid-
erable degree of confusion and uncertainty in the area of tax plan-
ning for United States affiliated foreign entities.16 3
Retroactive application of the test to a taxpayer's detriment, as
attempted in the MCA district court decision,' 6 4 is also open to
criticism.6 5 Although the I.R.S. has the power to apply its rulings
retroactively, 6 it has stated a policy preference for nonretroactive
application where a new ruling would have adverse tax conse-
quences to taxpayers. 6 7 This statement of I.R.S. policy justifiably
encourages reliance by taxpayers on the present Service rules and
regulations. Until the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-214, taxpay-
ers, especially those cognizant of the I.R.S. policy of nonretroactiv-
1979). A French socitb en nom collectif (s.n.c.) was held taxable as a partnership for United
States tax purposes even though the members of the partnership were a United States
corporation and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id. The separate interests test was not
mentioned in the ruling. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 205 for further discussion of
the difficulty in finding consistent application of the separate interests test in letter rulings.
162. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 206. "[I]f a single economic interest holds all
of the ownership and control, there is only one management voice and the foreign entity's
management is centralized in the single owner." Id.
163. Id. at 210. "[A] degree of uncertainty ... impels taxpayers to seek the assurance of a
private ruling and places a heavy administrative burden on the Service in granting rulings."
Id. See supra note 161 for a discussion of a number of conflicting letter rulings.
164. See supra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
165. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 212.
166. I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1982). "Retroactivity of regulations or rulings-The Secretary may
prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue
laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect." Id. See also MCA Appellant Brief, supra
note 1, at 21.
167. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a) (1982). "Where Revenue Rulings revoke or modify rulings
previously published . . . the authority of Section 7805(b) of the Code ordinarily is invoked
to provide that the new rulings will not be applied retroactively to the extent that the new
rulings have adverse tax consequences to taxpayers." Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(c) (1981)
Rev. Proc. 78-24, §§ 7.01(3), (5), 1978-2 C.B. 503. "[T]he criteria for limiting a revocation or
modification to only prospective applications are more stringent." Tax Section Report, supra
note 1, at 213.
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ity, could have expected the mechanical rules of the Kintner regula-
tions to be uniformly applied. Yet, these regulations were not
applied in either Revenue Ruling 77-214 or in the MCA district
court opinion. 168 This shaking of taxpayer certainty has been criti-
cized as a violation of due process rights.'69 In response to this
criticism, it has been argued that the holdings in Revenue Ruling
77-214 and in the MCA district court opinion involved no unfair
surprise.' 70 The taxpayers involved were aware of the intent of
Subpart F and were merely attempting clever avoidance of the
spirit of the I.R.C. provisions.' 7' This attempt at tax avoidance
should not be protected from what arguably amounts to a more
rational interpretation or, at most, an extension of Subpart F and
related provisions.' 72 Further, the I.R.S. is ultimately bound not by
its policy statement favoring nonretroactivity, but by the provisions
of the Code itself, which grant the Service wide discretion to make
retroactive applications.' 73
The area of foreign entity classification is problematic. 74 Any
mechanism, rule or policy which creates greater certainty in this
area would be appreciated by business concerns and tax practition-
ers. As a step toward greater definiteness, a firm rule requiring
prospective application is very desirable. '
In addition, questions of fairness arise with respect to the
exclusive application of the separate interests test to foreign entit-
ies.' 76 Although some policy justifications for this exclusivity may
exist, 177 any abuse of the classification rules involving foreign entit-
ies would be more effectively remedied by changing the law which
168. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from Rev. Rul. 77-214 on the facts. MCA,
685 F.2d at 1103.
169. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 212-14.
170. MCA Appellee Brief, supra note 61, at 12.
171. See id. at 12-13.
172. Id.
173. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 213. See also Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939) (holding that the Commissioner improperly reversed long-
standing regulations retroactively); Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance
and Retroactively, 43 TAXES 756, 761-63 (1965).
174. See supra notes 68-147 and accompanying text.
175. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 214-15.
176. Id. at 208-09.
177. Id. at 209. "If there are policy justifications for the use of a different standard, the
policies should be stated and dealt with in a specific and limited fashion." Id. For the
rationale in support of Subpart F, namely prevention of tax avoidance by United States
controlled foreign corporations, see supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
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allows the specific abuse to exist.1 78 In the case of MCA, for exam-
ple, the addition of partnerships to the Subpart F definition of
"related person" would have remedied any future attempts at tax
avoidance by similarly structured United States controlled foreign
entities. 179
Alternatively, the I.R.S. could clarify the area of foreign entity
classification by
promptly publish[ing] a list of foreign business organizations
that always would be classified as corporations if the list were
confined to at least a single form of organization for each princi-
pal jurisdiction, minimizing the necessity of making decisions on
hybrid entities and minimizing the risk of including any flexible
forms or organizations that may be in use by some taxpayers to
achieve partnership treatment. 80
This I.R.S. publication would assure United States taxpayers that at
least the listed classifications will not be challenged.
Recently, the Service has tried unsuccessfully to amend the
Kintner regulations.' 81 A proposed new amendment of the regula-
tions provides that, where limited liability exists with regard to all
members of an entity under local law, the entity is per se a corpora-
178. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 209 n.148 for examples of changes in the law
to remedy abuses involving United States affiliated foreign entities. See also infra note 207 for
Ninth Circuit court's similar comments in MCA.
179. See supra notes 98-147 and accompanying text.
180. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 210-11.
181. Fisher, supra note 28, at 627. On January 5, 1977, the I.R.S. published proposed
regulations under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) which established criteria and rules of operation for
distinguishing partnerships from corporations. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3, 42 Fed.
Reg. 1038 (1977). Most importantly, the regulations rejected the preponderance test and also
provided a means by which the I.R.S. could "reclassify an organization whenever it under-
goes a sufficiently material change with respect to at least one of the Morrissey characteristics
that might affect the determination of its overall corporate resemblance." Fisher, supra note
28, at 647. The regulations were withdrawn soon after their publication, adding to the
confusion in the area. Id. See also Peel, supra note 44, at 1000, wherein the author notes:
The Treasury responded to the airing of the deficiencies in its regulations in Larson
by publishing proposed regulations on January 5, 1977 . . . . [T]he proposed
changes were not published over Secretary of the Treasury Simon's signature, and
he ordered the notice of proposed rulemaking withdrawn on the following day.
According to contemporaneous news reports, the proposed regulations had been
published without the Secretary's knowledge and had aroused protests from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and other real estate interests who
were concerned that the threatened withdrawal of the tax benefits of direct owner-
ship would hurt real estate investment.
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tion.182 The amendment is designed to deal with "limited liability"
entities currently classified as partnerships. The outcome of this
legislation is uncertain; as of this date no hearing has been held,
although some experts have volunteered comments.183
Because the I.R.C. § 7701 regulations interact with numerous
and varied areas of the United States tax law, an attempt to revise
them is certain to be both difficult and controversial.184 The I.R.S.
has historically encouraged and initiated legislative changes in the
tax law, filling gaps where abuses were found to exist.185 Changing
the Kintner regulations would have many unforeseen repercussions
because of the interrelationship between the regulations and other
areas of the tax law. 186 In an area as complex and far-reaching as
entity classification, any broad change or illogical test adds rather
than diminishes confusion. The problems of the separate interests
test are better resolved in a more limited manner. Focusing legisla-
tive changes on Subpart F and other areas of tax law which interact
with I.R.C. § 7701 and its regulations is a more expedient solution
to the abuses in the area than amending I.R.C. § 7701 itself. Absent
a drastic change in the concepts underlying I.R.C.
§ 7701, legislation amending Subpart F is preferable to the separate
interests test.
In the event that no legislative change is made, United States
taxpayers should consider the separate interests test in structuring
their foreign business operations.187 Effective tax planning is a par-
182. Classification of Limited Liability Companies: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45
Fed. Reg. 75709-10 (1980). The proposed amendment states as follows:
Section 301.7701-2 is amended . . . [as follows] 301.7701-2 Associations
(a) Characteristics of Corporations .... (2) . . . However, such an organization
will be classified as an association if under local law no member of the organization
is personally liable for debts of the organization. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, only liability arising solely from membership in the organization shall be
taken into account; liability of a member as a guarantor on an obligation of the
organization shall be disregarded.
Id. Thus, under the proposed regulations, whenever limited liability exists, the entity will be
automatically classified as corporation. See id.
183. The hearings, scheduled for early 1981, were never held. 45 Fed. Reg. 75709-10
(1980). The outcome of this legislation is still unknown, though most of the opinions given by
outside experts have been strongly against its promulgation. Per telephone interview with
assistant in office of Paul A. Francis, attorney in I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel (May 31,
1982).
184. See Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 209.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 1.
187. See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 299.
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ticular dilemma for United States businesses which must establish
foreign juridical entities to avoid discrimination abroad, and which
seek tax deferral at home.188
Different methods have been suggested by tax counsel to
United States taxpayers wishing to achieve tax deferral through
entity classification.189 To avoid classification of foreign entities as
corporations under the separate interests test, United States parent
corporations may consider sharing their ownership interests with
unrelated third parties. 90 A determination of what percentage of
outside ownership would satisfy the I.R.S. is essential to this strat-
egy. 191 A degree of unrelated ownership satisfactory to the I.R.S.
may well be greater than the amount of control that a United States
parent would be willing to divest.
An alternative method for avoiding corporate classification is
the creation of "separate interests throughout the ownership
chain."1 2 If both United States corporations in MCA had formed
distribution outlets, separate interests might have been found with-
out inquiring into the directors' fiduciary roles. 'a The mutual dis-
trust and competitiveness of the two entities might have made such
planning impractical. The I.R.S., however, may still view such a
structure as an attempt to avoid Subpart F treatment comparable
to that of MCA.
A third recommendation is to have foreign entities' charter
include provisions to the effect that there is no free transferability of
interests or continuity of life in the entity, regardless of "unanimous
agreement to the contrary." 194 An example of this type of provision
would be one where the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement,
resignation, or expulsion of a member causes dissolution despite any
agreement by the members to continue the entity. 5 The I.R.S.
188. Tax Section Report, supra note 1, at 208.
189. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 299.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In MCA Appellant Brief, supra note 1, at 26, counsel states that "[h]ad MCA,
Paramount, CIC, and the employee trust been able to anticipate the new 'separate interests'
requirement, they could have altered their conduct simply by causing MCA and Paramount
each to acquire a direct minority ownership interest in the distributorships." Id. This presum-
ably would have made the distributorships unrelated persons in some counsel's opinion, but
perhaps not in that of the I.R.S. See MCA, 685 F.2d at 1103-04, for a discussion of a
fiduciary's duty of loyalty.
194. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 299.
195. Id.
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might view such a provision as illusory, inserted only with intent to
avoid United States taxes. While the recent Ninth Circuit decision
in MCA has left the future of the separate interests test uncertain, it
is apparent that separate interests will always be found where the
related owners have a fiduciary duty which is distinct from their
management function. Despite a commonality of ownership, any
business structure which has this divergence of responsibilities
would most likely withstand any I.R.S. challenge.
CONCLUSION
The separate interests test has, thus far, been formally consid-
ered in only one case. 96 The test has been applied solely to foreign
entities affiliated with United States shareholders; 9 7 comparable
domestic entities are still scrutinized by the mechanical application
of the Kintner regulations, which are slanted against finding that
unincorporated entities are corporations. 98 The test's analysis is
incomplete because it fails to apply the finding of a single economic
interest to all the corporate characteristics put forth in I.R.C.
§ 7701.199 A complete application of the test might lead to results
inconsistent with the Service's intent to tax certain income of United
States controlled foreign corporations when earned .200 For exam-
ple, using the separate interests test to ascertain the presence of
associates may cause an entity to be classified as neither a corpora-
tion nor a partnership. Rather, it is taxable as a branch of the
United States parent, and thereby avoids Subpart F provisions.20 '
In recognition of the need for fairness and predictability in tax
matters, only a prospective application of the test should be allowed
in the future. This would provide taxpayers with a reasonable
length of time to restructure their international operations. 202
As the Ninth Circuit indicates, the separate interests test is not
the most appropriate or effective way to end the current confusion
in foreign entity classification.20 3 Although legislative attempts have
196. See supra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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been unsuccessful,2 0 4 the need for statutory change is clear. Modifi-
cation or amendment of the Kintner regulations is a difficult and
arduous undertaking. A more immediate alternative to the separate
interests test would be statutory changes in Subpart F which would
prevent tax avoidance abuses through foreign entity classification.
It is suggested that a broadening of the Subpart F definition of
"related person" to include noncorporate entities would effectively
prevent avoidance of Subpart F by structuring United States foreign
controlled entities as partnerships rather than corporations, pursu-
ant to I.R.C. § 7701. The government, in its MCA Brief for the
Appellee 205 went so far as to argue that the word "corporation" in
the definition of related person is "not significant in the overall
scheme of Subpart F and should be understood in a manner which
furthers its purposes. '2 0  The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It com-
mented that a broad reading of the term "related person" without
actual statutory change is not a proper manner of dealing with
what appears to be a legislative oversight. 20 7
While awaiting statutory revisions, the implications of the
separate interests test must be taken into consideration by taxpayers
and their counsel. United States taxpayers wishing to structure their
204. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
205. MCA Appellee Brief, supra note 61, at 8-9.
206. Id.
207. The Ninth Circuit in MCA stated:
The government asserts that in enacting subpart F Congress was more concerned
with the nature of the income than the form of the entity generating the income,
and that CIC's distributorship income is precisely the kind that Congress intended to
tax currently under I.R.C. § 951(a).
We find this argument unpersuasive. Although we agree that CIC's distributor-
ship income is apparently the kind that Congress intended to tax currently if
received from a controlled corporation, we decline the government's invitation to
depart from the plain language of the statute. Congress wrote the statute unambigu-
ously to apply to subpart F income received from controlled "corporations" only. If
the omission of income received from controlled partnerships has indeed created an
unjustified loophole in the tax laws, the remedy lies in new legislation, not in
judicial improvisation ....
... [The section 301.7701-2) regulations, which were originally designed to
limit the availability of corporate tax status ... prescribe a mechanical and for-
malistic test, see Larson, 66 T.C. at 172, permitting taxpayers to select a form of
business organization with certainty about the attendant tax consequences. If the
test has proven unsatisfactory, or if the Commissioner determines that the test
should not apply to foreign entities, the Commissioner is free to promulgate a new
regulation that taxpayers can rely on in planning their foreign business ventures.
MCA, 685 F.2d at 1104-05 (citations omitted).
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foreign controlled entities to avoid Subpart F taxation may well
empathize with the Greeks' mythological lo, who, a target of
Hera's jealousy, was condemned to "wandering, and in fearsome
lands."1 08
Diane Francesca Krausz
208. E. HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY, TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 78 (1942).
